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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to present the preliminary results of a research project which
aspires to identify requirements for risk-reducing regulatory strategies aspiring to protect children and
young people in social networks. It aims to provide an insight into the changing role of law in today’s
networked society and the innovative regulatory solutions that will be able to deal with the paradigm shift
from mass media and passive, vulnerable consumers to media for mass self-communication and active
‘‘prosumers’’.
Design/methodology/approach – First, the legal impact of social networking sites (SNS) risks for
children and young people that have been identified in social science research is assessed, as well as
the applicability of existing legal instruments. Second, legal trends in this field and a number of recent
(alternative) regulatory initiatives and their implementation are discussed. In a final part, the use of such
alternative regulatory instruments and their compliance with the broader legal (human rights) framework
are analysed. To conclude, a number of elements for risk-reducing regulatory strategies for the
protection of minors in online social networks are identified.
Findings – The first research results point towards the importance of multi-stakeholder involvement,
proportionality of measures, procedural guarantees (such as transparency) and the careful combination
of regulatory strategies targeted at illegal as well as harmful conduct and content risks for a balanced
protection of minors in social networks.
Originality/value – Although social networks are very popular among young users, the risks that are
associated with these networks are not at all or not appropriately addressed by existing legal or
regulatory instruments. This article aims to contribute to developing innovative regulatory instruments
which are effectively addressing these risks.
Keywords Social networks, Protection of minors, Self-regulation, Co-regulation,
Alternative regulatory instruments, Youth, Regulation
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Participatory and collaborative online technologies, such as social network sites (SNS),
transform the way in which individuals interact. In the past five years, the popularity of these
SNS has expanded spectacularly, attracting an extraordinary number of users (e.g. 500
million users for Facebook) (Facebook, 2011a), particularly (but not exclusively) among the
younger generations. A recent EU-wide[1] study found that 59 per cent of 9-16 year olds
have a social networking profile (Livingstone et al., 2011), even though most social network
sites put the minimum age limit to create a profile at 13.
SNS, such as Facebook, Twitter and Netlog, can be credited with important positive
features, such as innovative and sophisticated opportunities to construct one’s identity and
the quasi unlimited sharing of social experiences, but they also create new risks or transform
risks that also exist in the offline world, in particular for vulnerable users, such as minors
(Council of Europe, 2010; Livingstone and Brake, 2010).
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It is assumed that the blurring between ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’ in online social networks, the
invisibility of audiences and the fact that information in such networks is persistent,
replicable, searchable, and visible on a large scale (boyd, 2008) entail that risks in an SNS
environment are significantly more complex compared to equivalent offline risks. Aside from
providing greater access to certain (illegal or harmful) categories of content (e.g. hate
speech) (Byron, 2008), and the facilitation of certain behaviour such as cyberbullying or
grooming (Enisa, 2007), an added complexity can be found in the transforming role of
minors, from passive consumers/victims to active contributors/perpetrators (Internet Safety
Technical Task Force, 2008). This element has also been taken into consideration in the
classification of a number of genuine online risks for minors, put forward by the recent
renowned EU Kids Online study as shown in Table I).
It is the aim of this article to approach these social science findings from a legal perspective.
Although over the past five years, online SNS have been the subject of study from diverse
disciplines, such as social sciences, economics or computer sciences, research into legal
risks has been significantly more limited and has in most instances focused on privacy
issues (Edwards and Brown, 2009; Wong, 2009). Research into the legal impact of content
and conduct risks that occur in a specific SNS context and the regulatory instruments that
can be used to address these risks has been rather rare.
This article will first assess the legal impact of the SNS risks that have been identified in
social science research, as well as the applicability of existing legal instruments. Second,
legal trends in this field and a number of recent (alternative) regulatory initiatives and their
implementation will be discussed. In a final part, the use of such alternative regulatory
instruments and their compliance with the broader legal (human rights) framework will be
assessed. To conclude, a number of elements for risk-reducing regulatory strategies for the
protection of minors in online social networks will be identified.
2. Legal impact of SNS risks
In order to be able to assess the legal framework that surrounds SNS risks a first task is to
translate the risks that have been identified by social scientists (see Table I)[2] into legal
qualifications. Starting from the classification put forward by the EU Kids Online project,
different legal ‘‘disciplines’’ come into play, such as:
B Human rights: e.g. infringement on freedom of expression, privacy/data protection
(EDPS, 2011; European Commission, 2010; Council of Europe, 2010).
B Criminal law: e.g. stalking, grooming, gambling.
B Media law: e.g. defamation, (audiovisual/print) content regulation.
B Electronic communications law: e.g. spam.
B Intellectual property rights law: e.g. copyright.
B Consumer protection, e.g. advertising, etc.
Transferred to the EU Kids Online table (Table I) a preliminary assessment of the potentially
applicable (broad) legal disciplines can be presented as shown in Table II.
Table I Classification of online risks
Commercial Aggressive Sexual Values
Content – child as
recipient
Advertising, spam,
sponsorship
Violent/hateful
content
Pornographic or unwelcome
sexual content
Racism, biased or misleading
info/advice (e.g. drugs)
Contact – child as
participant
Tracking/harvesting
personal information
Being bullied, stalked
or harassed
Meetings strangers, being
groomed
Self-harm, unwelcome
persuasion
Conduct – child as
actor
Gambling, hacking, illegal
downloads
Bullying or harassing
another
Creating and uploading
pornography
Providing advice e.g.
suicide/pro-anorexic chat
Source: Hasebrink et al. (2009, p. 26)
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On the basis of this table, taking into account the different risks, the different applicable legal
disciplines and the role of the child, a number of (problematic) issues, that will have an
impact on the creation of risk-reducing regulatory strategies, can be identified:
1. First, although it is possible to identify the broad legal disciplines that might be linked to
SNS risks, within these disciplines, there are of course different strands of legislation that
will be applicable to specific situations or acts. In practice, this will vary from country to
country[3], since even in today’s society in which borders are increasingly irrelevant and
people are connected worldwide, for instance through social networks, legislation is still
very much based on territoriality and states are usually only able to enforce legislation
within their borders.
2. Second, when addressing SNS risks for minors, it is essential to differentiate between
illegal acts or content and harmful acts or content. Whereas certain acts of bullying might
not be serious enough to be classified as illegal (and hence fall under certain criminal
provisions), this does not mean that these acts do not harm certain children. Or, whereas
certain content, for instance violent or sexual content, might not be considered as illegal
by the courts, it might still be considered problematic if certain categories of vulnerable
users or viewers are confronted with such content. Although it remains a fact that ‘‘what is
illegal offline, is also illegal online’’ a number of SNS risks, more specifically those that are
related to harmful or inappropriate conduct and content, will not necessary entail the
applicability of specific legislation. In this respect, it can be noted that the ‘‘terms and
conditions’’ of SNS providers might provide some indications as to their policies with
regard to what they consider to be ‘‘harmful behaviour/content’’[4].
3. Third, in the era of traditional mass media, information and data were put in the public
domain by a limited number of content providers, such as broadcast organisations or
newspaper publishers. Public interest goals and fundamental rights (including freedom
of expression, protection of minors, cultural diversity, privacy, etc.) have been traditionally
safeguarded through a set of obligations imposed on these institutions that are
professionally active in the production and dissemination of information. Whereas this
limited number of institutions can be controlled with relative ease in a top-down regulatory
system, this is much harder in the online social media environment where users
themselves are distributing enormous amounts of information, about their personal
opinions, their likes and dislikes, their professional activities, or about others.
With regard to minors, this latter trend or paradigm shift from provider/supply-oriented to
user/demand-oriented media raises more specific issues:
1. First, as was mentioned in the introduction to this article, there are the changing roles that
minors play in the social media eco-system: from passive ‘‘victims’’ to active creators,
Table II Legal impact of SNS risks
Commercial Aggressive Sexual Values
Content – child
as recipient
Advertising, spam,
sponsorship
Violent/hateful content Pornographic or
unwelcome sexual content
Racism, biased or misleading
info/advice (e.g. drugs)
Human rights, media law,
consumer protection law,
electronic communications
law
Human rights, media
law, criminal law
Human rights, media law,
criminal law
Human rights, media law,
criminal law, consumer
protection
Contact – child
as participant
Tracking/harvesting personal
information
Being bullied, stalked
or harassed
Meetings strangers, being
groomed
Self-harm, unwelcome
persuasion
Human rights, privacy/data
protection
Criminal law, media
law
Criminal law Criminal law
Conduct – child
as actor
Gambling, hacking, illegal
downloads
Bullying or harassing
another
Creating and uploading
pornography
Providing advice e.g.
suicide/pro-anorexic chat
Criminal law, intellectual
property rights law, consumer
protection
Criminal law, media
law
Human rights, media law,
criminal law
Criminal law
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data controllers, perpetrators (of various potentially criminal acts: bullying (Palfrey et al.,
2010), posting sensitive material, piracy/illegal downloading . . .), journalists, editors, or
even sellers? Each of these roles may – in theory – entail different legal consequences
and the applicability of specific legislation (e.g. data protection legislation or journalistic
deontology). On the one hand, this leads to questions regarding liability. Can minors be
held liable for certain acts they commit, or will it be possible to hold parents or
educators/schools, or even the social network providers themselves, liable? On the other
hand, the fact that minors commit certain criminal acts in the SNS environment has, in
certain jurisdictions, such as the United States, led to the application of legislation to
situations for which this legislation was not intended. The most obvious example in this
context has been the application of child pornography legislation to ‘‘sexting’’[5] or the
distribution of nude pictures by peers[6]. This may lead (and has already led) to the
conviction of minors, who took pictures of themselves or their boyfriend or girlfriend (who
may be very close in age), to prison sentences and the duty to register as a sex offender
for a very long period (Zhang, 2010; Sacco et al., 2010). The rationale behind child
pornography legislation has traditionally been to punish adults who sexually abuse and
exploit children. Although it may be possible that even when intimate pictures have been
taken consensually, without duress, these could later be exploited and lead to harm (for
instance when those pictures are distributed on a large scale e.g. when a relationship has
ended), it seems disproportionate to apply legislation with such heavy sanctions, and
potentially life-ruining consequences to minors.
2. A second issue, closely linked to the roles that minors adopt in a social networking
environment, is their awareness of the rights of others: e.g. right to image, privacy
(Grimmelman, 2009), copyright, . . . With regard to these rights prior consent is often
necessary in order to be allowed to share information about or pictures of other
individuals. However, the legal validity of consent by minors is not at all obvious.
Depending on the specific jurisdiction, the validity of consent might be dependent on age
or in certain instances parental consent might be necessary. Linked to these questions is
the question to what extent minors may carry out activities which have legal
consequences (e.g. e-payment/electronic transactions), for instance when signing up
to specific services which require payment.
3. Legal and regulatory trends in the online environment
From the previous section, it is possible to conclude that the application of ‘‘old-school’’
legislation, which has traditionally been used to protect minors, is confronted with many
challenges in the SNS environment. Although the policy goal of protecting minors still
remains valid in this environment (Lievens, 2010), traditional regulatory measures become
less effective in a social media ecosystem, characterised by its abundance, ‘‘globalness’’
and massive user participation.
This fits in with the broader regulatory trend from centred to decentred forms of regulation that
has been noticeable over the past decades. The former type of regulation – also dubbed
‘‘command-and-control regulation’’ – which entails that the state performsall regulatory tasks
(creation, implementation and monitoring, and enforcement), increasingly displayed a
numberof shortcomings, especially in complex sectors. Suchshortcomingswere for instance
the territoriality of traditional legislation (see above), slow legislative processes that cannot
keep up with societal evolutions, and a lack of expertise and involvement of knowledgeable
actors. As a result, decentred forms of regulation, which are much more flexible and open to
the involvement of different actors in the regulatory process, grew in importance. It is this
developmentwhichcanalsobecreditedwith thegrowingenthusiasm for theuseof alternative
regulatory instruments (ARIs), such as self- and co-regulation. Self-regulation entails the
creation, implementation and enforcement of rules by a group of (private) actors with no (or at
leastminimal) involvement of actors that donotbelong to this group (suchas thegovernment).
Co-regulation is a regulatory strategy that consists of elements of state regulation and
elements of self-regulation. Apossible co-regulatory construction, for instance, can entail that
the state or government takes an initiative to set up an ARI or provides a legal basis to do so,
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and that private actors are responsible for the actual implementation. In most cases of
co-regulation, a government safety net in case of failure of the self-regulatory elements is
established. The enthusiasm for these types of ARIs was reflected in numerous international,
EU and Council of Europe (CoE) policy documents within the framework of the ‘‘Better
Regulation’’ discourse (OECD, 1995; European Commission, 2001, 2002; European
Parliament, Council, and European Commission, 2003).
Since the mid-1990s, in the media sector, pre-eminently a complex sector, and certainly with
respect to the protection of minors against online risks, emphasis has been put on less
legislation and more alternative regulation. One comment can be made with regard to the
trends towards less legislation in this particular domain. Although it is true that, at first sight,
one might assume that traditional content regulation rationales, based on the pervasiveness
of massmedia and large impact of programmes that are simultaneously watched by viewers,
lose much of their strength with regard to digital media (characterised by a multitude of
information sources and channels, individualised patterns of media consumption and a high
degreeof choice andcontrol), the reality seems tobemorecomplex. Especiallywith regard to
minors, who have always been protected to a certain extent in all existing media, one can
wonder whether the increase of control and choice warrants less regulation[7]. It has been
argued that an important element with respect to children’s use of new media is that of
‘‘context’’. Whereas linear media, such as television or film, offer content within a context ‘‘that
tells a story or establishesa framework of expectations that is recognisedbyandmakes sense
to the consumer’’ (Millwood Hargrave and Livingstone, 2006), non-linear technologies permit
content to be seen out of context (for instance, short clips on YouTube or Facebook, and
images received via mobile phone). Other significant differences, which may have an impact
on the effects of newmedia on children and young people, are the facilitated access to (more
extreme forms of) content, the growing element of ‘‘choice’’ and the lowered threshold for
content production (making it possible, for instance, to take pictures and disseminate them
across the whole world by uploading them to a social network) (Millwood Hargrave and
Livingstone, 2006). It might be premature to assume that on-demand, user-centric media do
not need the same guarantees with regard to the protection of minors as traditional media. In
the future, social sciencemight provide an answer to this issue. However, it remains a fact that
traditional legislation is not very effective in a social media environment.
4. (Alternative) regulatory initiatives
Policymakers have increasingly become aware of the risks concerning SNS (European
Commission, 2008), especially with regard to minors, and a few regulatory initiatives
(International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, 2008; Council of
Europe, 2008; Facebook and Attorneys General, 2008; UK Council for Child Internet Safety,
2010; Council of Europe, 2010) have already been taken in order to address certain of these
risks. Fitting in with the trends that were described above, these initiatives can mostly be
categorised as ARIs in which different stakeholders are involved.
A number of SNS providers, for instance, subscribed to a self-regulatory[8] charter titled
‘‘Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU’’ (SSNPs) in February 2009, following a public
consultation on online social networking by the European Commission (2008). The
pan-European principles have been developed by SNS providers in cooperation with the
Commission and a number of NGOs ‘‘to provide good practice recommendations for the
providers of social networking and other user interactive sites, to enhance the safety of
children and young people using their services’’ (European Social Networking Task Force,
2009). In order to achieve this one of the core elements of the SSNPs is multi-stakeholder
collaboration (including SNS providers, parents, teachers and other carers, governments
and public bodies, police and other law enforcement bodies, civil society and users
themselves). The seven principles that are put forward are the following:
1. Raise awareness of safety education messages and acceptable use policies to users,
parents, teachers and carers in a prominent, clear and age-appropriate manner.
2. Work toward ensuring that services are age-appropriate for the intended audience.
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3. Empower users through tools and technology.
4. Provide easy-to-use mechanisms to report conduct or content that violates the terms of
service.
5. Respond to notifications of illegal content or conduct.
6. Enable and encourage users to employ a safe approach to personal information and
privacy.
7. Assess the means for reviewing illegal or prohibited content/conduct.
In February 2010, the results of an independent evaluation of the implementation of the
SSNPs were made public (Staksrud and Lobe, 2010). This evaluation analysed the
self-declaration statements of the signatories to the charter as well a number of services
offered by them (Lobe and Staksrud, 2010). Overall, the report showed that there was
(significant) room for improvement. As Commissioner Reding (2010) stated:
However, some important measures have not yet been implemented: Less than half of the
signatories make minors’ profiles visible only to their friends by default; Only half of the tested
sites ensure that minors are not-searchable via search engines; Only nine out of 22 sites respond
to complaints submitted by minors asking for help. I expect companies who signed up to the
Safer Social Networking Principles to take rapid action to improve this situation.
In June 2011, the results of a second assessment of the SSNPs proved also to be
disappointing, for instance with regard the principle of ensuring that minors’ profiles are
accessible only to their approved contacts by default, which only 2 SNS providers were
found to comply with (Donoso, 2011; European Commission, 2011).
This raises the question of the effectiveness of this type of regulatory initiative: although the
commitment of the SNS providers to take steps to make their services safer is to be
applauded, the concrete implementation of such safety measures is of course crucial in
order to achieve actual protection. The text of the SSNPs mentions ‘‘[t]hese Principles are
aspirational and not prescriptive or legally binding, but are offered to service providers with a
strong recommendation for their use’’. This does not provide a solid base for enforcement,
nor a compelling incentive for compliance. Hence, the question whether self-regulatory
instruments provide enough guarantees with regard to the prevention of certain risks and the
protection of fundamental rights and values seems relevant.
5. The use of ARIs in compliance with the broader legal framework
It is very important to be aware of the fact that the use of alternative regulatory instruments
does not occur in a legal vacuum. On the contrary, there are fundamental rights and other
legal requirements – stemming from conventions, constitutions, laws, jurisprudence and
soft law instruments – that need to be respected when creating, implementing and enforcing
ARIs. Areas where concerns can arise are, for instance, the protection of fundamental rights,
such as freedom of expression, privacy and the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy,
internal market regulation, competition rules, and certain implementation requirements
(Lievens, 2010).
Within the context of this article it is not possible to address all these different areas, but an
analysis of the relevant legal provisions, conducted in a previous research project, showed
that there are no legal obstacles which lead to an a priori or absolute exclusion of the use of
ARIs to protect minors. However, this general conclusion should be nuanced in two ways.
On the one hand, there are a number of requirements which need to be taken into account
in order for ARIs to comply with the legal framework (see Table III). ARIs which aim to
protect minors against harmful content could possibly restrict other fundamental rights,
freedoms and principles, especially the freedom of expression, the right to privacy, internal
market legislation and competition rules. Yet, the protection of minors is a goal of public
interest, which can, in many cases, be considered a possible justification to restrict the
above-mentioned fundamental rights and freedoms. However, measures which interfere
with these rights and freedoms should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this
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aim. Hence, in balancing the different interests at stake, proportionality will be a very
important guiding principle. On the other hand, the applicability of certain provisions,
typically those that are in theory addressed at states or governments, will depend on the
level of government involvement in ARIs. This means that a number of provisions will be
more likely to apply when there is a degree of government involvement, as is common with
respect to co-regulatory systems. Conversely, self-regulatory systems may fall outside of
the protection of the legal framework (except, for instance, when theories, such as the
‘‘horizontal effect’’ theory[9], can be applied). In our opinion, this might be dangerous in a
delicate area such as the protection of minors in the online environment. Hence, to protect
minors the use of co-regulatory systems, where there is an actual symbiosis between the
involvement of the government and other actors, and greater guarantees are provided as
to the actual realisation of the policy objective, is preferable. We can frame this finding also
within the current general ‘‘malaise’’ with respect to self-regulation or regulation by the
market or the sector (see for instance, the financial crisis). As a consequence, in different
sectors, the calls for a renewed and more intense involvement of the government have
recently grown louder.
A second conclusion from the study of the relevant legal provisions is that ARIs should be
carefully structured. Attention should not only be paid to the respect for freedom of
expression and privacy, but also to issues which may be more easily overlooked such as the
respect for procedural guarantees (such as the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective
remedy). When important rights are at stake, when decisions are made that might interfere
with such rights, the least that can be expected from a decision-making body is adherence
to certain procedural safeguards, such as independence, impartiality and transparency (for
instance by means of reasoned decisions). Furthermore, such decisions must be
disputable.
6. Identifying elements for risk-reducing regulatory strategies in SNS
To conclude this article, an attempt is made to provide a preliminary identification of a
number of guidelines for the creation of efficient risk-reducing regulatory strategies for the
protection of minors in online social networks:
1. A multi-stakeholder approach is essential. Only regulatory strategies in which the
different stakeholders (government, SNS providers, parents, schools and minors) take
up part of the responsibility will have a chance of reducing SNS risks. And although
parents, schools and users must play an important role, the SNS industry must
strengthen their commitment and put more effort in implementing the safety measures
they are claiming to provide in a user-friendly and effective manner (Kroes, 2011). In
this respect, incentives to comply are of the utmost importance. An incentive may be
their social responsibility to profile themselves as providers that feel very strongly
about child safety. However, commercial interests will often be considered more
important, and in such cases the incentives to comply can be supplied in the form of
governmental pressure. Governments do have an important role to play, in ensuring
Table III Legal framework for ARIs
Fundamental rights Freedom of expression Article 10 ECHR
Right to privacy Article 8 ECHR
Right to a fair trial Article 6 ECHR
Right to an effective remedy Article 13 ECHR
Internal market Free movement of goods Articles 34 to 36 Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) (ex 28 to 30 EC Treaty)
Free movement of services Articles 56, 57 and 52 TFEU (ex 49, 50 and 46 EC
Treaty) þ sector-specific provisions
Competition rules Prohibition of anti-competitive agreements Article 101 TFEU (ex 81 EC Treaty)
Prohibition of abuse of dominant position Article 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC Treaty)
Implementation requirements Freedom of choice of methods to implement
directives
Article 288 para. 3 TFEU (ex 249 EC Treaty)
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that initiatives that have been taken by other actors are monitored and evaluated, and
if needed, in insisting on a stronger enforcement of those initiatives. Their involvement
will provide greater guarantees as to the actual achievement of goals of public interest,
in casu the protection of minors.
2. In ensuring an appropriate degree of the protection of the right to freedom of expression
as well as the right to privacy, two rights that are crucial with respect to the protection of
minors in SNS, proportionality is of the utmost importance. This general legislative
principle should be the guiding principle when risk-reducing regulatory strategies are
established: the measures in question should be suitable to attain the objective that is
envisaged and should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective. This
also entails that when attempting to protect minors their own rights to freedom of
expression and privacy[10] should not be restricted too much.
3. Equally important is the fact that risk-reducing regulatory strategies should ensure a
number of procedural guarantees (Council of Europe, 2010). The measures taken should
be transparent, and must provide for a right to appeal. Compliance with such guarantees
is not only essential for alternative regulatory instruments to be credible; it also ensures
that the rights that are at stake are protected in an adequate manner.
4. In order to achieve a comprehensive protection of minors in SNS it is crucial to combine
regulatory strategies targeted at illegal and harmful content and conduct. However, a
different emphasis will be necessary depending on the nature of the content or conduct
that is targeted:
B With regard to illegal content and conduct, it is necessary to implement and enforce
existing legislation in a pragmatic and efficient manner, and in certain instances,
consider whether new legislative initiatives are required (Kroes, 2011). However, such
initiatives must be creative, must take into account the fast-changing nature of SNS
and must address their transborder scope. In any case, the application of legislation
which has been drafted with a completely different purpose in mind should be
avoided. In addition, it is necessary that awareness and training of law enforcement is
increased and that cooperation between law enforcement and SNS providers is
improved.
B With regard to harmful content and conduct, given the findings that the use of
technology (which has been promoted to enhance children’s online safety since the
mid-1990s; e.g. blocking and filtering techniques, age-verification tools) might not be
as straightforward in a social media environment (Deloitte and European Commission,
2008; Innova et al., 2011; Grimmelman, 2009), continued efforts are required with
regard to the promotion of media literacy, education and awareness-raising. Research
into user-empowering and innovative transparency enhancing tools and techniques,
peer-review instruments, easy-to-use reporting mechanisms, and age-dependent
accounts must continue to be undertaken.
The research that lies at the basis of this article will be continued in the context of several
research projects at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT. The ultimate goal of this
research is to identify the requirements for risk-reducing regulatory strategies aspiring to
offer an enhanced and balanced protection of minors in the social media ecosystem, and in
this manner, to provide an insight into the changing role of law in today’s networked society
and innovative regulatory solutions that will be able to deal with the paradigm shift frommass
media and passive, vulnerable consumers to media for mass self-communication and active
‘‘prosumers’’.
Notes
1. In the USA, a study found that ‘‘73 per cent of wired American teens [ages 12 to 17] now use social
networking websites [. . .]’’ (Pew Research Center, 2010).
2. Of course, myriad classifications of the different risks that children are exposed to exists. For
instance: Walrave (2008): content-related risks, commerce-related risks and contact-related risks;
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Biegler and boyd (2011): sexual solicitation and internet-initiated sex crimes involvingminors, online
harassment and cyberbullying, youth access to problematic content, youth-generated problematic
content.
3. For the UK, for instance, an overview is given in: UK Council for Child Internet Safety (2010).
4. E.g. Facebook’s terms: ‘‘[. . .] You will not bully, intimidate, or harass any user. You will not post
content that: is hateful, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic
or gratuitous violence [. . .]’’ (Facebook, 2011b).
5. Defined as ‘‘youth writing sexually explicit messages, taking sexually explicit photos of themselves
or others in their peer group, and transmitting those photos and/or messages to their peers’’ by the
US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children: National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (2009).
6. Sacco et al. (2010) refer to the fact that ‘‘it is important to recognize that young people have been
taking sexually provocative photographs since the Polaroid. The difference now is that such images
can be produced, transmitted, reproduced, and retransmitted with ease, without the subject’s
approval or even knowledge, and quickly can reach a much wider audience’’.
7. This is an argument that has often been put forward within the context of the review of the AVMS
directive, Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on
the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
member states concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services
Directive), OJ 15.04.2010, L 95/1, recital 58.
8. Even though the label ‘‘self-regulation’’ is attached to this charter, it could be argued that it is a
co-regulatory instrument. The Charter was fostered by the European Commission and is evaluated
at regular intervals by experts appointed by the Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/information_
society/activities/social_networking/eu_action/selfreg/index_en.htm (accessed 17 June 2011).
However, strict categorisations of regulatory instruments are rather irrelevant and we advocate
the use of the umbrella notion ‘‘alternative regulatory instruments’’ (Lievens, 2010).
9. The complex ‘‘horizontal effect XE ‘‘horizontal effect’’ theory entails that if national law accepts the
direct effect of the ECHR articles, individuals or private actors can, in certain circumstances, invoke
article 10 ECHR before the national courts to challenge other individuals.
10. As for instance laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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